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ABSTRACT 
 
The interpretation of experimental data in neuroscientific research concerning moral deci-
sions is controversial. One of the leading experimenters in the field, Joshua Greene, holds 
that the data show that deontological theories of morality are the expression of a confabu-
lation which tries to give a rational justification for emotional responses. His arguments are 
criticized on the basis of a different interpretation of deontology. On the other hand, Marc 
Hauser, John Mikhail and others have proposed a research project in moral psychology 
called Universal Moral Grammar. This perspective is more promising as far as the norma-
tive dimension of moral judgment is concerned. Yet, it is suggested that rather than look-
ing for the universal moral principles we should look for the (univerdsal) formal principles 
of morality, in a more thoroughly Kantian perspective.  
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
The current debate in neuroethics is particularly interesting for metaethics. 
Experimental findings seem to give a lot of work to those who look for a the-
ory of morality which aims at being consistent with what we can know about 
ourselves.  
The most disputed issue in this respect is the role of emotions in moral rea-
soning. Yet, there are many ways to take up this issue. One way is to try to 
make a picture of the psychology of morality, i.e. trying to assess the way emo-
tions and reasoning are intertwined in the process of moral decision making. 
This is what the experimental findings about decision making seem best fitted 
for.  Another way is to inquire into the normative role of emotions in moral 
reasoning, i.e. trying to understand if and in what measure emotions can be 
considered not only a cause of certain judgments and behaviours, but also (and 
mainly) a justification for those judgments. What is commonly known in 
metaethics as the issue of moral normativity is here receiving a new kind of evi-
dence and argument, which seem to pose hard challenges to such well estab-
lished accounts of morality as intuitionism, rationalism, sentimentalism, de-
ontology and consequentialism.  
Only a few authors in this debate keep the two ways apart. Many try to 
build up a case in which the empirical findings do constitute an argumentative 
basis for normative claims, especially in terms of a critical assessment of rival 
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theories: if a theory of moral normativity, i.e. a theory trying to account for 
the authority of moral judgments, is at odds with a reasonable account of 
moral psychology according to the most recent findings, then there is reason 
to consider that theory seriously flawed, at least in so far as it does not seem to 
be able to offer alternative accounts which can fit with the most relevant 
data.  
A vigorous example of this kind of critique is advanced by Joshua Greene 
in his so far most philosophical published essay (Greene 2008, but see also 
Greene 2003 and Greene and Cohen 2004). Here, Greene first summarizes a 
wealth of experimental data, offering an interpretative framework which, he 
claims, remains at the level of a “strictly empirical” claim. Then, he proceeds 
to argue that “if these empirical claims are true, they may have normative 
implications, casting doubt on deontology as a school of normative moral 
thought” (p. 36). Greene is a skilful experimenter, and his scientific articles 
have offered what is probably the most cited set of experiments using moral 
dilemmas as a fundamental research tool (Greene et al. 2001; Greene and 
Haidt 2002). His attempt to derive normative conclusions from his own find-
ings is therefore not only legitimate but extremely relevant for the moral 
theorist. His attempt is also a good example of a kind of literature which can 
legitimately be called neuroethics, since he develops a methodological claim as 
well as a substantial one, and this is what one should expect, if anything, from 
neuroethics. So, there is a general relevance in discussing Greene’s hypotheses 
concerning deontology, since the issue here is wider, including some methodo-
logical and metaethical issues which situate this discussion on a more general 
background.  
I will first summarize his arguments for justifying the normative conclu-
sions he draws, and take into account the discussion that those claims have 
raised (Mikhail 2008, Timmons 2008). Then I will raise some objections and 
suggest a theoretical perspective in which the good reasons of some of his cri-
tiques can be accommodated in a less deflationary view of deontological 
thought. I will also briefly consider the Universal Moral Grammar project 
proposed by Marc Hauser (Hauser 2006), John Mikhail (Mikhail 2007) and 
others as a possible alternative to Greene’s approach and suggest a slight 
modification of their perspective. 
In a sense, I will use the distinction between descriptive and normative 
language as a critical frame against Greene’s arguments, but this should not 
be understood as a straightforward application of the is-ought argument. I am 
not claiming that experimental data are irrelevant to normative theory. On 
the contrary, I consider empirical research in moral psychology as extremely 
relevant for moral theory, though not as a “groundwork” for normative 
claims, but as a kind of “critical test” offering reasons to exclude the empiri-
cally implausible implications of some normative theories.  
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1. The essence of deontology 
 
In his 2008 essay, Greene argues that “it is possible that philosophers do not 
necessarily know what consequentialism and deontology really are” (Greene 
2008, p. 37). Sure, it can be true. Philosophers tend to think that deontology 
and consequentialism are moral theories (rather: families of moral theories) or, 
to be more precise, models of moral reasoning. Even if these philosophical 
models do not reflect exactly what subjects can be described to do on a statis-
tical basis (this is what science does), they offer the standard procedure of 
proper moral reasoning. In other words, according to the philosophers, deon-
tology and consequentialism are normative images of moral reasoning, as much 
as logic is a normative image of cognitive reasoning which is not necessarily 
statistically prevailing among human subjects. Here, in the normative per-
spective, “normal” brain functioning in the sense of statistically prevalent is 
considered not equivalent to “correct thought”. What we will end up with, 
along this line, would be a new edition of the old dispute on psychologism and 
the laws of logic, with the difference that this time the question is not whether 
the laws of logic but the laws of moral thought are derived from psychological 
(or, rather, neurological) facts and laws. Many think that Frege’s and 
Husserl’s arguments against psychologism were definitive, but – definitive or 
not – the question here is whether they are also applicable to the laws of moral 
thought or not.  
 Greene states his case defining deontology and consequentialism as “psy-
chological natural kinds” i.e. “philosophical manifestations of two dissociable 
psychological patterns, two different ways of moral thinking, that have been 
part of the human repertoire for thousands of years” (pp. 37-38). He then con-
centrates on deontology. His claim is that “what we find when we explore the 
psychological causes of characteristically deontological judgments might sug-
gest that what deontological moral philosophy really is, what it is essentially, 
is an attempt to produce rational justifications for emotionally driven moral 
judgments, and not an attempt to reach moral conclusions on the basis of 
moral reasoning” (p. 39).  
This is a bold claim. Yet, on a very superficial level, one might observe that 
this is not really in line with what scientists in the modern tradition claim for 
their results: Galileo famously declared that he did not intend to “try the es-
sences” (“tentar le essenze”) and considered this as a fundamental methodologi-
cal advice. Good science, in the Galilean tradition, is not the attempt to dis-
cover the essence of anything, but rather to investigate phenomena, trace 
regularities and formulate hypotheses which might be disconfirmed by subse-
quent research. Anyway, to be fair, this is not really a critique of Greene’s ap-
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proach: it seems clear that in this essay he is not playing the scientist’s role; 
rather, he is legitimately doing the philosopher’s job. Although he starts with 
saying that “philosophers may not really know what they’re dealing with 
when they trade in consequentialist and deontological moral theories, and we 
may have to do some science to find out”, I think that what he is really doing 
here is moral psychology as a philosophical discipline, using experimental data 
to justify theoretical conclusions concerning the essence of things. But after 
all, so far, so good: that’s what many of us are in, doing moral theory (some 
philosophers would disparage the concept of essence, but I am not that kind of 
philosopher).  
 Seen from this perspective, Greene’s essay is a theoretical critique of a 
particular philosophical tradition, based also – but not exclusively – on some 
empirical findings. What are the (theoretical) faults which Greene charges de-
ontology with? Basically, the charge is that “Deontology […] is a kind of 
moral confabulation” (p. 63): the social and moral behaviour of people is the 
effect of “intuitive emotional responses” which deontology offers to rationalize 
ex post, so that our illusion to be rational agents can be reassured. So, in the 
end, “Deontology, I believe, is a natural “cognitive” expression of our deepest 
moral emotions”, in the sense that it is the rather awkward attempt to trans-
form an emotive response into a cognitive one1. On the other hand, according 
to Greene, “there is a natural mapping between the content of consequential-
ist philosophy and the functional properties of “cognitive” processes” (pp. 63-
64). Thus, consequentialism is the properly cognitive response to moral di-
lemmas, while deontology is essentially an emotive response which pretends to 
be cognitive or introduces cognitive elements upon an already taken emotional 
evaluation.  
 From the point of view of metaethics, Greene draws the conclusion that 
some of the core premises of most versions of deontology are false: in particu-
lar, the idea that our deontological judgments rest on the basis of rationally 
discoverable moral truths. Since those judgments result from confabulations 
following deeply felt moral emotions, it is not necessary, and it is maybe false, 
to say that those emotions just happen to correspond to rational moral truths. 
It is more parsimonious to say that there are no such moral truths and that 
deontological moral judgments derive from our contingent emotional endow-
ment, which is the result of evolution, culture, geography and personal his-
tory. As a consequence, there is no role for the universality (or the universal-
                                                 
1 Greene is explicit in characterizing in defining “cognitive” representations as “inherently 
neutral”, in the sense that they do not trigger particular behavioural responses, while 
“emotional representations generate automatic effects” (Greene 2008, p. 40). The two kinds 
of representation seem to correspond to different areas in the brain (dorsolateral surfaces of 
the prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes for cognitive processes; amygdala and the medial 
surfaces of the frontal and parietal lobes for emotional processes).  
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izability) of deontological principles, such as, say, respect for persons. Deonto-
logical judgments can have a general (not a universal) value so far as some ba-
sic emotional reactions tend to be similar across cultures. But there are great 
differences between these reactions, especially if you look for more detailed 
emotional responses issuing in determinate moral judgments as, say, the le-
gitimacy of lying or the normativity of natural heterosexual procreation. 
Thus, it is only contingent that we find ourselves agreeing about a certain de-
ontological rule (e.g. do not kill innocent human beings), and  this agreement 
should not be understood as an expression of rationality: it is simply the fact 
that we just happen share some gut reactions towards some morally relevant 
situations. Sure, there is the work of post-hoc rationalization, which intro-
duces a lot of potentially critical stuff into the process of decision making. 
Yet, Greene’s and Haidt’s findings suggest (or at least can be interpreted as 
suggesting – see also Haidt 2001) that these rationalizing processes are sub-
stantially irrelevant for the most deontologically pure judgments, and in any 
case they are not the essence of deontological theory. Rather, deontology is es-
sentially an emotionally driven process which its proponents disguise as a ra-
tional justification for action. This is why deontologists do not know what de-
ontology really is. On the contrary, the only legitimate rational process con-
cerning decision is the “cognitive”, slower, calculating one which is adequately 
interpreted by the consequentialist tradition.  
 There is nothing particularly new in such an interpretation of the basis of 
morality. David Hume was even more radical in denying to reason any inde-
pendent role whatsoever in moral argument. Yet, his perspective was also not 
one leaving any universalist claim aside, since he himself repeatedly declared 
that moral sentiments are natural, “since there never was any nation of the 
world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly depriv’d of them, 
and who never, in any instance, shew’d the least approbation or dislike of 
manners. These sentiments – Hume continues – are so rooted in our constitu-
tion and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by dis-
ease or madness, ‘tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them” (Hume 1739-
40, 474). Hume’s claim is quite close to the idea of “human nature” as a kind 
of essence, in this case. This claim is not likely to be shared by contemporary 
critics of the notion of human nature and to many who consider the biological 
account of human life as no more than a contingent synthesis of various ele-
ments that evolution and technology might radically change in the future. 
This is a crucial point for moral theory, since if there is anything like a “hu-
man nature” one can raise an argument in favour of universalism even in a 
thoroughly sentimentalist perspective (we share some universally natural 
common feelings); I suspect that Greene and others in this discussion would 
not accept this universalist claim and would only concede that the empirical 
data suggest that some moral emotions seem to have a general prominence 
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among the investigated subjects. So far, but in the future we may have differ-
ent feelings. 
 Also, there is nothing lethal in this attack for deontology as such: as 
Mark Timmons (2008) has pointed out, there might well be a sentimentalist 
deontology which departs from the long-standing tradition of entrenching de-
ontological thought in pure rationality. Something similar might even be sus-
pected about Jeremy Bentham’s Deontology (the unfinished work to which 
Bentham worked sparsely from 1814 to 1831). And yet, I believe that a senti-
mentalist deontology would soon be asked to give up, from the normative 
point of view, to the rationally superior perspective of consequentialism (and 
in fact, what Bentham calls deontology is really the part concerning private 
morality of a thoroughly consequentialist system).  
 So, Greene’s case is mainly that the empirical findings collected by him, 
his collaborators and a host of other researchers in the field of neurosciences 
constitute a powerful argument against the (prevailing) self-image of deonto-
logical theory. And this is understood as an argument in favour of consequen-
tialism as a more powerfully cognitive attitude towards moral issues. Since 
this kind of attack is likely to be replicated, in various versions, it seems inter-
esting to suggest some critical points.  
 First, if the empirical results do suggest that some non-consequentialist 
answers, such as those reported in the so-called “personal” dilemmas2, are ir-
reducible (that is, persons go on to refuse to directly kill one person in order to 
save five), this should be taken at face value and be considered as an argument 
against consequentialism. As Bernard Williams pointed out, “we are partially 
at least not utilitarians, and cannot regard our moral feelings merely as ob-
jects of utilitarian value. Because our moral relations are partly given by such 
feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot “live with”, to come to re-
gard those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as 
happenings outside one’s moral self, is to lose a sense of one’s moral identity; 
to lose, in the most literal way, one’s integrity. At this point utilitarianism 
alienates one from one’s moral feelings” (Williams 1973, pp. 103-104). So, it 
should sound strange that we cannot literally make rational sense of these 
feelings against the cost-benefit analysis: if our brain should be interpreted as 
having no way to give any reasonable meaning to these anti-consequentialist 
feelings but to say that they just happen to be produced by evolution, we 
should feel rather alienated at that thought. And well, this is not the way it 
feels: when we make deontological judgments, at least in the most obvious 
cases, we think that we are defending our sense of integrity rather than being 
possessed by some kind of external force. Of course, Greene is not arguing 
straightforwardly for utilitarianism against deontology, but against the self-
                                                 
2 Greene has become skeptical about the viability of the distinction between personal and 
impersonal dilemmas. See his reply to Mikhail and Timmons, 2008. 
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image of deontology itself; yet, he elsewhere argues (Greene 2002, Greene and 
Cohen 2004) that consequentialism is “the best available standard for public 
decision making” (Greene 2008, p. 77), so it seems that his arguments should 
build up at least a presumption in favour of some form of consequentialism. 
This presumption is indeed at work but does not really seem to be vindicated 
by the findings reported. On the contrary, if consequentialism is the result of 
detached, cold evaluation of consequences made on the basis of the “cogni-
tive” ability of calculating some of the effects ahead of some time, we should 
wonder whether our moral life is best served by following this detached way of 
thought or by listening and interpreting some of our spontaneous inclinations. 
 Second, the fact that “Our most basic moral dispositions are evolutionary 
adaptations that arose in response to the demands and opportunities created 
by social life” (Greene 2008, p. 60) does not mean that they cannot count as 
reasons. To assume that any rationalization is a kind of ex-post confabulation 
seems exactly to assume that our feelings should never count as reasons. And 
in this respect, the processes under what is called S1 (fast, immediate proc-
esses) in the Double Process Theory ask for rational interpretation no less 
than those under S2 (slow, mediated ones). So why call the search for a justifica-
tion a confabulation? Greene suggests that the deontologist’s claim is to dis-
cover that those feelings just happen to correspond to eternal moral truths. 
But this is not an unavoidable path for deontologists: as it is easy to suggest, 
constructivist accounts of moral reasons can accept that we use our moral feel-
ings as a starting point to build up a consensus over what we would propose as 
principles that no one could reasonably reject (cfr. Scanlon 1998). It is no use 
to say that this kind of process leaves the feelings just as they are (an argu-
ment which Greene calls the GIGO problem: “Garbage in, garbage out”, 
Greene 2008b, p. 116), because the point is not to take out a principle from a 
feeling, but rather to validate or refute a feeling as a reason which can be justi-
fied by a principle. After the process of reflective thought, the content does 
not change, but its formal structure is different: what is just a feeling which I 
happen to have, if it can be assumed as a reason and translated into a princi-
ple which it would be unreasonable to refuse, becomes a proposed universal 
law, which is offered to us as rational agents to share and to live with. This is 
not strange at all, and we can use that principle to help our reflection in new 
and hard situations. Consequentialism as a psychological natural kind cannot 
take into account this kind of reflective work in any reasonable way, and this 
suggests that it cannot be considered the only “cognitive” process involved in 
moral reasoning. 
 Third and most important: psychological kinds are not normative theo-
ries, as Greene himself admits. But then, why deriving normative conclusions 
from the description of psychological kinds? Basically, we do moral theory be-
cause we want to know whether our common sense judgments may have some 
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kind of justification. But justifying is not explaining. And moral theory is not 
genealogy. We have a lot of morally relevant emotions, some of which do offer 
good reasons to act in a certain way under certain circumstances. But we do 
not endorse them when they do not seem to be a sufficient justification for our 
behaviour: what Christine Korsgaard (1996) calls “reflective endorsement” is 
not an attempt to substitute rational principles for natural feelings, it is rather 
to validate those feelings as good reasons for action. And validation is not con-
fabulation (otherwise, science as a validation procedure would be confabula-
tion as well). On the other hand, if the only available form of justification is 
the consequentialist calculus, then the real question is: if consequentialism is 
also just a psychological natural kind, then why should it be the only one to 
have normative authority – and why should we deny that the deontological 
psychological kind has any of that authority? Offering a genealogy of moral 
judgments is certainly useful for normative theory: for example, we can cer-
tainly say that a moral theory which would exclude any feeling from the exer-
cise of moral judgment would be mistaken. The point is that no serious phi-
losopher has ever maintained such an absurd view. Everybody knows that Ar-
istotle defined choice as “desiring thought, or thinking desire” (NE, book VI, 
1139 b), and Kant famously said that there is no man without moral senti-
ments (indeed, one who lacks or loses such a sensibility would be “morally 
dead”) and that all we have to do is to strengthen and cultivate them (Kant 
1797, 400).  
When the question is “on what basis can a moral judgment be considered 
valid?”, the point is not only whether it takes feelings into account: the point 
is how it manages to make the feelings good reasons for action and to separate 
those feelings which can be good reasons from those which cannot. The rea-
sons take feelings into account but do not derive their authority from the feel-
ing themselves. A good reason is a reason which can be shared as a reason for 
action. And if we try to define a principle which does not take into account 
those feelings, or which would suggest us that we should systematically vio-
late our deep moral emotions, then we would have a highly implausible moral 
theory. Just like moral consequentialism is. As a normative theory, in fact, 
consequentialism is a peculiarly abstract one. As a psychological kind, it is a 
particularly alienating one.  
 Thus, maybe there are other ways to read the relevant empirical findings 
of neuroethics: trying to derive normative consequences from the description 
of abstract psychological kinds seems a debatable method.  
 
 
2. The linguistic analogy 
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The battlefield of neuroethics is far from being dominated by the anti-
deontological argument. From the same body of evidence, as well as from 
other experiments using moral dilemmas as a fundamental test for subjects 
taking hard decisions, a number of authors have built up a case for a straight-
forwardly deontological interpretation of the data (Hauser et al. 2007). Marc 
Hauser (Hauser 2006), John Mikhail (Mikhail 2007) and others are developing 
a research program of great complexity, which aims at giving a general 
framework for the interpretation of moral thought along the lines of an anal-
ogy with language. John Rawls had already devised such an analogy in a pas-
sage from A Theory of Justice (1971) and the authors are trying to bring it 
forward and to give it a basis in empirical evidence. The fact that in linguistics 
the Chomskyan project of entrenching a universal grammar on a scientific ba-
sis has gained prominence (cfr. Moro 2008) offers a good example for connect-
ing empirical data with a general speculation on universal, and not just gen-
eral, features of the cognitive faculties. This research program is called Uni-
versal Moral Grammar (UMG). 
The collision of the UMG model with the sentimentalist account of deonto-
logical rules is direct and challenging: the empirical data show some differ-
ences in the responses to various kinds of dilemmas, which might suggest that 
there is an underlying structure of rules which is replicated across individuals 
and groups. This recurrence does not depend on the activation of the same 
cortical areas, but on the influence of recurring patterns of reasoning; so it is 
suggested that the relevant factor in deliberation is a cognitive, though not 
conscious, structure and that in this respect computational theory is at least 
as relevant as the use of fMRI. 
The hypothesis behind the UMG project can therefore be interpreted as a 
defence of a cognitive account of moral thought, but in a different sense of the 
term “cognitive”. While Greene uses it as a way of indicating the processes 
which are attributed to the system of slow and mediated mental functions  (S2 
in the Dual Process Theory), the account in the UMG project is rather that of 
an underlying structure which is the source of some aspects of both kind of 
systems (S1 and S2) and so accounts for both the emotive and the “cognitive” 
aspects of moral thought. If the analogy with linguistics holds, the idea is that 
just like the basis of language are embedded in our biological and mental en-
dowment as human beings (as we have evolved so far), generating the variety 
of the natural languages on the basis of an invariable structure, so the funda-
mental principles of morality constitute a kind of natural framework upon 
which the historical moralities have been generated in a continuous interplay 
with the natural and cultural environment. To state it boldly: if there is a 
logic behind the variety of natural languages, there can be a logic behind the 
variety of historical moralities. Therefore, the research program looks for 
these structures, in the form of some recurring principles, such as the duty 
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against intentional battery and, quite surprisingly, the principle of double ef-
fect.  
 Now, to put it simply, the idea of a Universal Moral Grammar might be 
considered a new and extremely refined version of an intuitionist model of 
moral thought, where intuitions are cognitive acts or structures and not just 
emotions. In this perspective, intuitions are the basis of our moral reasoning: 
some fundamental principles are at least implicitly present in our mind, offer-
ing the foundations for a number of less abstract and more determined rules 
which may differ between the different cultures along parameters. In the 
UMG project, the interesting advancement in comparison with the old-
fashioned intuitionism of, say, W. David Ross is in the idea, drawn from both 
linguistics and the Rawlsian constructivist model, that the fundamental prin-
ciples are to be understood more as structures of moral thought than as self-
evident “prima facie duties”. The findings suggest that at least one principle 
(the principle of double effect) “may be operative in our moral judgments but 
not open to conscious introspection” (Hauser et al. 2007, p. 1): its influence is 
found in subjects of different cultures and with different educational level, al-
though the subjects themselves do not seem to be aware that their judgments 
in the case, say, of the footbridge dilemma, are driven by that principle. In a 
more general perspective, Hauser suggests that “moral judgments are medi-
ated by an unconscious process, a hidden moral grammar that evaluates the 
causes and consequences of our own and others’ actions” (Hauser 2006, p. 2). 
This perspective is ambitious and has a very wide scope. It does not need to 
go into the vexed question of the emotional or rational foundation of moral-
ity, since its basis is not thought to be an expression only or mainly of one of 
the two psychological processes: the Universal Moral Grammar is an underly-
ing set of operating principles which are translated into reflection together 
with emotions. The advantage point is that if the basis of morality is thought 
to be a process rather than a faculty (emotion or reason), and if I can find the 
operating laws of the process, I might be able both to understand the subse-
quent structures underlying the cognitive processes and the deviation from 
the standard procedure.  
Yet, I think that this project has not developed this intuition to its full 
strength. The ambiguity of this description is the fact that the underlying 
principle(s), though the subjects seem not to be aware of it (them), can be ex-
pressed in a highly refined manner in a moral theory, just like the one that 
used to support the principle of double effect (PDE) in the classical Thomist 
perspective. PDE does not seem to be totally unconscious and unaccessible to 
awareness, if some ingenious philosophers can devise a definition of it and pose 
the conditions under which the principle is thought to work. So one wonders: 
is the underlying principle really “inaccessible to conscience” or is it just im-
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plicit and open to reflective scrutiny, so that an adequate moral theory can 
bring it to the fore?  
Another ambiguous point is the status of the underlying principles we 
should look for: are they material principles, indicating determinate behaviour 
patterns  (do not kill, do not lie, show gratitude, tell the truth and so on) or 
are they one or more formal principles (just like the principle of double effect 
is), i.e. rules indicating not what we should want to do, but how we should 
want to do anything we want to do? As I will now suggest, this is exactly 
what makes the difference between an intuitionist approach and a transcen-
dental one, the one Kant suggested on the basis of the absolute formality of 
the fundamental principle of morality (which is not a determinate duty, but 
the rule of all valid duties).  
  
 
3. A Kantian hypothesis 
 
One of the dimensions of the issue at stake here is the need to have an ade-
quate theory of normativity: if we are not clear on what is a reasonable ac-
count of the authority which moral judgments claim to have, we may end up 
conflating different levels of discourse and asking the wrong questions to ex-
periments and theories as well. 
My suggestion to experimenters, in a very humble tone, is that they might 
consider the possibility that, after all, Kant was right in believing that the 
foundations of morals are exclusively formal. The Categorical Imperative is not 
a moral principle, it is the principle of morality: it does not prescribe what to 
do but how a reason which pretends to justify an action has to be structured. 
In this perspective, it is not so much a matter of finding the commonly shared 
moral principles by way of a survey, but of finding the recurring formal struc-
tures underlying the different moral principles and rules that the various cul-
tures have devised. Therefore, if we make an extensive survey concerning the 
moral opinions of people (like the “Harvard moral sense test”), we will proba-
bly not find that principles as “do not lie” or “hold promises” are universal as 
such. Yet, we might find that the process through which the subjects elabo-
rate reasons in order to justify their actions can include those principles but in 
the end depend on some formal constraints, of which those principles are just 
some of the possible material versions. The rules concerning lying, promising 
and benefitting others, for example, may depend on the culture and on the 
history of the acting subject. But what makes the subject able to reflect upon 
what he is doing (while he pretends to be able to justify it) is the operation of 
a kind of law which does not contain a determinate moral content (“do not kill 
the innocent”) but which imposes an internal requirement to any working 
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(i.e.: justifying) practical reason (“you cannot will as a universal law the rea-
son you are pretending to act on”).  
In this perspective, duties might be thought as the result of a complex 
process in which inclinations, desires and external conditions create the basis 
of an action which the agent wants to perform. Within this act of willing, the 
agent has a number of reasons which interact with each other. Some of these 
reasons pretend to be justified and justifying, i.e. they claim to have a norma-
tive role. What makes one or more of those reasons really justifying is not 
their conformity to the content of a moral principle, but the possibility of will-
ing that content (whatever it is) as a universal law. If willing that content as a 
universal law brings me to a practical contradiction (a contradiction in the 
will), then that reason is not a (morally) good reason. This is, basically, the 
Kantian suggestion concerning the foundations of moral normativity. If this is 
right, we should be able to find some effects of this underlying structure, al-
though it needs not being de facto known to everyone who acts morally. Since 
it is a formal structure of practical thought, it should be found virtually eve-
rywhere and operating also underneath the level of consciousness, but I see no 
reason why it should be impossible to make it sufficiently clear upon reflec-
tion. There are many ways of expressing that kind of formal operating rule, 
which may retain a very general resemblance even under different definitions 
(“respect for persons”, the Golden Rule, the rule against intentional battery, 
even the principle of double effect, and, not surprisingly, even a possible in-
terpretation of the utility principle). What makes these formulations similar is 
their formal status of laws of a rational will, which in the end might be re-
duced to an extremely general formal principle: what may be called the prin-
ciple of non contradiction in the will. So, rather than material principles we 
should be able to find recurring logical structures of practical reasoning, which 
do not constitute moral principles but rules of practical thought. Moral prin-
ciples inscribe the moral sentiments into the logical structure of practical 
thought. And this might account for the recurrence of some contents of moral-
ity which seem to be shared, to a certain extent, through cultures: it is ex-
tremely hard to will as a universal rule certain kinds of action, at least in nor-
mal circumstances. The rest is up to the virtually infinite variety of interpre-
tations of the relation between feelings and practical thought, along lines 
which in the history of moral philosophy were made famous by many great 
thinkers such as Aristotle and Kant.  
In this perspective, consequentialism seems to be only a part of the story: 
of course we take into account the consequences and we do compare more ver-
sus less good or evil. But that’s not the only way our practical thought judges. 
Among its rules, the universal principle of not willing what cannot be willed 
without contradiction offers a foundations for many different duties and rea-
sons for action. The consequentialist calculus comes in when I recognize that 
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an action (e.g. the trolley dilemma in its simple form) is not an example of us-
ing someone merely as a means, and that therefore, in those situations, what 
happens is more the result of a tragic situation than the object of a choice di-
rected at killing someone. The essential point is to keep it clear that showing 
how we arrive at a decision is not, not yet, showing how we are able to justify 
that decision. To look for the principles of justification is not always the same 
as looking for the processes of explanation.  
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